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An Empire for the Faithful,
A Colony for the Dispossessed
Robert D. CREWS
Abstract
Tsarist officials proclaimed a “civilizing mission” in Central Asia, but, in ruling
this territory, they saw in Islam both a tangible instrument of domestic policing and the
essential element of a “forward policy.” Paving the way for the projection of tsarist
power from Turkestan into neighboring regions, tolerance would, they hoped, allow
Russia to undermine British rule and compete for the loyalties of Muslims throughout
Asia.
Keywords: Religious tolerance, Civilizing mission, Race, Sunnis, Shi’ites, Ismailis,
Baha’is, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus, France, Great Britian, India, Afghanistan, Persia,
Bukhara.
Résumé
Les fonctionnaires tsaristes ont fait état d’une « mission civilisatrice » pour l’Asie
centrale, mais, en gouvernant ce territoire, ils ont vu dans l’islam à la fois un instru-
ment de politique intérieure et un élément essentiel d’une « politique vers l’avant ».
Préparant le terrain dans le but d’étendre le pouvoir tsariste depuis le Turkestan vers
les régions voisines, les Russes espéraient, par leur tolérance, miner le pouvoir britan-
nique et le concurrencer pour gagner la fidélité des musulmans dans l’ensemble de
l’Asie.
Mots-clefs : Tolérance religieuse, mission civilisatrice, race, sunnites, shi’ites,
ismaïlis, baha’is, Juifs, Sikhs, Hindous, France, Grande-Bretagne, Inde, Afghanistan,
Perse, Boukhara.
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Religion and Imperial Politics
Russia’s encounter with Central Asia inspired many new strategies of im-
perial rule. Born in defeat at the hands of the European powers in the Crimean
War, the Russian advance into the region presented tsarist elites with an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate their credentials as Europeans. Foreign Minister
Aleksander Gorchakov’s famous circular of 1864 depicted the empire’s ac-
tions in Central Asia as those of a “civilized state” obligated to bring order to
“wild lands” along its borders. Tsarist expansion was motivated, he explained,
“less by ambition than by necessity,” making Russia an empire that acted in
Asia just like “the United States in America, France in Africa, Holland in its
colonies, [and] England in East India.”1
Echoing Gorchakov’s evocation of a “civilizing mission” in Turkestan,
Russian military authorities adopted a universalist idiom of humanitarianism
and scientific progress. At the turn of the century, Governor-General Sergej
Dukhovskoj (1838-1901; r. 1898-1901) proclaimed that the Russians had
abolished “with one hand the coarse, arbitrary rule of petty despotic rulers,
[and] with the other smashed the fetters of slavery and sowed the healthy seed
of humane Christian culture,” opening up “the path to universal progress for the
numerous peoples of Central Asia.”2 As other essays in this book show, edu-
cated Russians – as well as some Muslim intellectuals – celebrated the intro-
duction of the railroad, irrigation projects, European medicine and hygiene,
and modernist urban design as signs that the Russian incorporation of the
region had begun to awaken the local peoples from “a mediaeval condition of
apathy and anarchy.”3
Such declarations about Russia’s affinity with contemporary European em-
pires reflected tsarist elites’ recent adaptation of colonial knowledge from
abroad. In particular, they built upon several decades of Russian military
scholarship. Since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, tsarist officers
in the Caucasus had been studying rival empires, focusing especially on French
policies in North Africa. In the 1860s and 1870s, the European-oriented “Great
Reforms” of Alexander II and the attraction of nation-state formation in
Germany and elsewhere drew tsarist elites closer to their imperial contempo-
raries. In metropole and colony alike, various sciences had become tools of
exploration, conquest, and administration. Disciplines from cartography and
1 Kappeler, 2006, pp. 142-143.
2 RGVIA, f. 1396, op. 2, d. 448, l. 3.
3 Tcharykow, 1931, p. 159.
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engineering to ethnography flourished in the colonies of Europe and the United
States; tsarist subjects, too, participated in the international circulation of this
knowledge, and the acquisition of Central Asia afforded Russian scholars a
vast laboratory for further refining this scholarship.
Between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, elites of the
European powers tended to share a vision of empire that opposed such secular
knowledge to religious phenomena. According to this view, irrational, back-
ward, and fanatical religions accounted for the “slumber” of colonized peo-
ples. Confident of the superiority of Enlightenment ideas about science and
reason, many Europeans nonetheless sought the conversion of colonial popu-
lations to Christianity. However, these efforts were often met with resistance,
and colonial regimes frequently opted for other kinds of cultural transforma-
tion.4 The East India Company, for example, professed “neutrality” towards
religious matters in opposition to the intense lobbying of evangelical
Protestants who called for broader support for missionaries in India.
Despite such rhetoric, company officials, like other colonial rulers, inter-
vened in a wide array of religious affairs in search of ways to strengthen their
power. In some contexts, they acted as patrons of shrines and scholars; in
others, they sought to incorporate “religious laws” into colonial judicial sys-
tems. “We have endeavoured,” one East India Company official in India ex-
plained, “to adapt our Regulations to the Manners and Understandings of the
People, and the Exigencies of the Country, adhering as closely as we are able
to their ancient uses and Institutions.”5
Warren Hastings, the author of such a scheme in late eighteenth-century
India, reasoned that “in all suits regarding inheritance, marriage, caste, and
other religious usages, or institutions, the laws of the Qur’an with respect to
Mahometans and those of the Shaster with respect to gentoos [Hindus] shall be
invariably adhered to.”6 In Egypt, Napoleon’s secular regime also professed
support for Islam and its sacred law. By the 1830s, Europeans operating in
Muslim societies from North Africa to India and Indonesia had begun to
establish what David Robinson has called, in the French context, “institutions
of control.” Primarily of a legal character, these were designed to show British,
French, Russian, and Dutch tolerance for Islam and its authoritative spokesmen
and, more broadly, to bring order to territorial possessions inhabited by
4 See, for example, Viswanathan, 1989.
5 Cohn, 1996, p. 26.
6 Van der Veer, 2001, p. 113.
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Muslims. In the late nineteenth century, such institutions acquired an even
greater significance: European powers increasingly competed with one another
– and with Muslim states such as the Ottoman empire and Afghanistan – for the
loyalties of Muslim subjects. By the early twentieth century, the French cele-
brated their identity as a “Muslim power” – an imperial state to which Muslims
could pledge their loyalty. Where such states “were successful in institution
building,” Robinson observes, “and in establishing a certain hegemony as a
‘Muslim power,’ they might reduce investment in the apparatus of repression.”7
Most of these broader European currents came together in Russia’s ap-
proach to the “Muslim question” in Turkestan. In administrative terms, Russ-
ian authorities had to manage a vast space, marked by a complex topography,
and enormous population with a small number of officials. The tsarist regime
pledged non-interference in local religious matters but simultaneously set about
constructing institutions of control that, in turn, prompted wide-reaching reli-
gious, cultural, and social change. As agents of discipline and control, Islamic
institutions and authorities could prove useful. Like their European rivals in
Asia and Africa, Russian officials presented themselves as patrons of Islamic
institutions and piety and attempted to use Islamic law to police Turkestani
society and, like the French, to win over the allegiance of Muslim subjects by
positioning themselves as the representatives of both a civilized European state
and a Muslim power.
A closer look at Russian rule in Central Asia also reveals important differ-
ences between the tsarist and other empires. The Tsars had ruled Muslim
populations since the fifteenth century, and the regime continuously adapted its
policies to new settings and populations, ultimately resulting in approaches
that changed over time and varied in their specificities from location to loca-
tion. From a comparative perspective, the Russian case stands out not only in
the duration of tsarist rule over Muslims but in the wide geographic distribu-
tion of the Muslim communities themselves and, most importantly, in the per-
sistence of some fundamental understandings of religious tolerance in the
minds of tsarist elites. Since the late eighteenth century, tsarist tolerance did not
mean neutrality or non-interference. Just as the Orthodox Church remained
supreme, the state claimed the power to intervene on behalf of officially estab-
lished authorities and canonical texts. Since the early nineteenth century, the
Ministry of the Interior had largely been responsible for administering the non-
Orthodox Christian confessions of the empire. In Central Asia, many of these
7 Robinson, 2000, pp. 75-76.
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responsibilities shifted to military authorities. Between the late eighteenth cen-
tury and the 1860s, official ideas about Islam evolved in key aspects, and the
rise of Russian nationalist ideas amplified some officials’ hostile views of the
faith. Thus, when the empire’s military authorities constructed the governor-
generalship of Turkestan, they rejected the institutional architecture for the
administration of Muslim affairs established by Catherine the Great. Yet they
retained many of its fundamental principles, namely those that envisioned
Islam as a force for social discipline that would play a central role in govern-
ing these populations. In Russia, policies varied by region and population, but
resort to the politics of confessionalization – rule through religious personnel
and institutions – transcended administrative boundaries.
Among the European empires, by contrast, differences between religious
policies in the colonies and the metropole were greater than in the tsarist
empire. This disjuncture was most striking in the case of France. At the height
of French colonial expansion and republican anti-clericalism under the Third
Republic, tens of thousands of Catholic priests and religieux won official sup-
port for their contribution to the empire. J. P. Daughton has shown that “from
Church Sergeevskaja at Tashkent, after 1910.
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the 1880s to the First World War, the daily operation of the so-called republi-
can civilizing mission in the French empire was regularly carried out by the
republic’s sworn ‘enemies’ – Catholic religious workers – many of whom not
only had serious reservations about colonialism but were openly hostile to
republicanism.”8 Religious policies in the British colonies differed consider-
ably from those in the metropole as well. Peter van der Veer has noted “a def-
inite secularity of the British state in India that was much stronger than in
Britain itself.” “The British,” he contends, “considered a sharp separation of
church and state essential to their ability to govern India.”9
The vulnerable geopolitical position of Russian Turkestan further distin-
guished religious politics there from other European colonial scenarios.
Stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Chinese border, these new possessions
brought Russia into closer contact with Persia, Afghanistan, British India, and
China. Tsarist authorities faced the challenge of severing their Muslim sub-
jects’ ties to their co-religionists in neighboring states. While the Persians,
Afghans, and Chinese might trouble Russia’s strategic thinkers at particular
moments in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
they understood the real danger – and opportunity – to reside in India.
In Turkestan, officials saw in the regime’s religious policies the tangible
instruments of domestic policing;and, somewhat more abstractly, these policies
also appeared as the essential elements of a “forward policy.” The emancipatory
rhetoric of tolerance pointed in multiple directions. Seeking political advantage,
St. Petersburg had long championed the cause of persecuted religious commu-
nities and dissidents in neighboring states, from Poland to the Ottoman empire.10
In Central Asia and neighboring regions, tsarist authorities found a wealth of
opportunities to liberate slaves, rescue minority groups from discrimination and
persecution, and ameliorate the condition of women suffering under the rule of
ostensibly corrupt and unjust rulers. At the same time, tolerance would allow
Russia to win the sympathies of Muslims throughout Asia, and Islam would serve
as a means to challenge British power. Tsarist authorities hoped to mobilize the
promise of liberation from the British yoke to pave the way for the projection of
Russian power from Turkestan into neighboring regions.
In declaring the empire a refuge for the Muslim faithful as well as for the
dispossessed communities within these Muslim societies, tsarist authorities
8 Daughton, 2006, p. 6.
9 Van der Veer, 2001, pp. 22-23.
10 See LeDonne, 1997.
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aspired to create a powerful wedge. The tsarist practice of tolerance offered
leverage against “despotic” Muslim rulers and customs when the interests of
Jews, Baha’is, Shi’ites, or others intersected with the emancipatory rhetoric of
Russian officials. To tsarist officials who dreamed of utilizing Turkestan as an
outpost for the liberation of India, Islam appeared to be an asset that Russia
alone could deploy on the world stage.
The Tsarist House of Islam
The Russian military arrived in Central Asia in the 1860s bearing the ban-
ner of European civilization and proclaiming an end to the tyranny of local
khans and amµrs. Governor-General Konstantin von Kaufman (1818-1882;
r. 1867 to 1882) echoed British claims to neutrality when he proclaimed a
policy of “ignoring” Islam, by which he meant a shift from policies developed
on the Orenburg frontier that had elevated a muftµ and the Orenburg Muham-
madan Ecclesiastical Assembly over the mosque communities in the Volga
River and Ural Mountains provinces, Siberia, and the imperial capitals. Like
their contemporary rivals, however, Russian officers nonetheless looked to
salvage whatever they could from the local landscape of indigenous institu-
tions and men of influence. In each town seized by tsarist forces, Russian
commanders sought out local clerics and notables to negotiate the terms of sur-
render and, when hostilities came to an end, to act as intermediaries and clients.11
Religious authorities were not the only intermediaries and religion was not
the only taxonomy available to tsarist authorities. Military geographers, ethno-
graphers, and travelers debated the historical origins and linguistic, cultural,
and racial attributes of the “nationalities,” “tribes,” and “peoples” they found
in Turkestan. As Sergej Abashin has shown, most Russian scholars tended to
divide the settled population they encountered into “Uzbeks” and “Tajiks.” The
relationship between these two groups and a third ethnographic category of
people, the “Sarts,” provoked interpretive disputes that continued into the early
Soviet period.12 Where these categories offered confusion, the world of religion
seemed to be more accessible to people and institutions of influence, especially
in the region’s major urban centers. To tsarist administrators, Islam may have
been inferior to Christianity, but it still offered a useful form of social regula-
tion. Muslim institutions recommended themselves because they policed
11 See Crews, 2006.
12 Abashin, 2004, pp. 38-101.
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morality and kept order. Islamic law structured commercial contracts, for
example, and knowledge of this law could be used to pursue administrative
goals such as state acquisition of land.13 Moreover, Muslim prayer leaders,
scholars, endowment managers, teachers, and judges were, in this view,
government clients in the making. As tsarist rule expanded outside of urban
centers such as Tashkent and Samarkand, constant rivalries among clerics drew
tsarist officials into mediating disputes, which gave district officials numerous
opportunities to conduct surveillance of urban and rural communities. Russian
officers were still haunted by anxieties of rebellion, of course, but many were
buoyed by constant Muslim appeals to tsarist officials seeking salaries, some
piece of legislation, confirmation in office, or police intervention. In nearly all
such cases, these demands grew out of the search for leverage against Muslim
rivals.14
The recruitment of indigenous personnel was crucial to the functioning of
institutions of control that still claimed legitimacy in Islamic legal terms but
which were now subordinated to the direction of Russian authorities. In the
case of law courts, for example, incorporation meant substantial reorganization,
which had important implications for local society and, in particular, for
religious authority. The courts oversaw litigation according to the sharµ‘a, but
their jurisdiction was limited largely to matters that Russian judicial experts
regarded as belonging to “civil” affairs. At the same time, they retained some
power over “criminal” matters relating to morality and religion;tsarist law even
amplified their powers by standardizing prison sentences for some offenses.
Court procedures became, at once, more bureaucratic, and more participatory.
In a major departure from indigenous judicial systems, the judges were now to
stand for popular election, and their writ was geographically formalized. At
the same time, just as townspeople participated in the selection of judges, they
increasingly had recourse to alternative venues. These included not only the
Russian courts, where tsarist law prevailed and where appeals could be pur-
sued. They also entailed more informal exchanges, often initiated by a denun-
ciation or petition, between dissatisfied litigants and Russian officials eager to
act as guardians of justice. In the settled regions of Turkestan, officials assumed
that the sharµ‘a represented the appropriate law for this population. They aimed
to wield this law – or at least the legal norms that they could derive from osten-
sibly canonical texts – both to legitimize their rule and to order this society.
13 See, for example, Nalivkin, 1904, pp. 1-56.
14 Crews, 2006, chapter 5.
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Russian entanglement in religious disputes among Turkestanis may not have
achieved both goals, as tsarist officials conceived them, but it did significantly
contribute to the solidity of administrative control in the region while offering
Muslims powerful incentives to engage with tsarist institutions. While some
‘ulam±’ counseled against contact with the regime, petitions, denunciations,
and court records reveal that in this sphere, as in so many others, Muslim
men – as well as a number of women – frequently ignored their prescriptions.
From the late 1860s on, Muslim appeals to the regime became widespread.
These overtures were no doubt inspired by complex motivations. Some sup-
plicants may have been critical of the Russian presence but still open to its use
against more dangerous enemies: impious or heretical Muslims or other rivals
such as competing Jewish merchants. Recourse to the tsarist state offered an
avenue for challenging hierarchy or for advancing alternative interpretations.
In adopting the practice of petitioning, denouncing, and taking their neighbors
to court, the inhabitants of Turkestan quickly acclimated to the imperial envi-
ronment. Non-scholars were not just consumers of religious knowledge; they
were also producers, who engaged in religious controversies with their co-reli-
gionists in a variety of ways. Although tsarist institutions were not as dense in
the governor-generalship as in other parts of the empire, both urban and rural
Turkestanis became skilled at engaging with the regime just as other tsarist
subjects had learned to do, whether in the western borderlands, the Caucasus,
or in the core Orthodox Christian provinces of “European Russia.”
Even if more remote settlements or recalcitrant milieus generated fewer de-
nunciations, a local district chief [uezdnyj nachal’nik] needed only one written
accusation or a single oral complaint to launch an investigation and solicit fur-
ther testimony from an entire mosque community, madrasa, settlement, or
town quarter. The former are well documented in local and central archives
(especially collections such as that assembled by Count Konstantin K. Palen
[Pahlen] during his inspection of the region in 1908-1909), but the latter surely
played a critical role as well. Orientalist scholars might dismiss these voices as
inauthentically “Muslim” and thus illegitimate, but such an approach would
ignore windows onto the thinking of non-elite men and women who otherwise
left few records behind. Though inspired by specific grievances that varied
from place to place, their cumulative effect was to draw the state into local
life – and the population into the administrative machinery – and, from the
point of view of tsarist authorities, to offer a degree of popular assent to the
Russian-led liberation of Central Asia. Officials generally welcomed such
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overtures because they affirmed Russian authorities’ self-image as the eman-
cipators of an oppressed population. Moreover, they supplied valuable intelli-
gence and shed light on the inner workings of a variety of communities.
Tsarist patronage of Islamic institutions and support for what officials took
to be “orthodox” rites and practices did not, of course, win over all opponents
and critics of Russian rule. Nevertheless, in the wake of the Andijan uprising
of 1898 led by Dukchi Ishan [Dpikchµ ¥sh±n], Muslim intellectuals’ debates
about the rebellion prompted a defense of the state of Muslim religious life
under Russian rule. As Hisao Komatsu has shown, thinkers such as Mu∆ammad
Ypinus Khw±ja T±’ib criticized such rebellion [fitna] because, he reasoned,
Turkestan belonged to the Hanafi legal category of D±r al-Isl±m;as part of the
“House of Islam,” Turkestan was a territory where Muslims could reside and
meet the obligations of the faith. A former official of the Khanate of Kokand,
T±’ib had emigrated to Kashgar (where he served Ya’qub Bek in the jih±d
against the Qing) and India before returning to Russian-ruled Kokand, where,
in 1886, he became an Islamic law court judge and worked with Russian of-
ficials. T±’ib argued that
“At present, the population of the Ferghana Valley and Turkestan should make
use of their positive conditions as much as possible. This country can be consid-
ered D±r al-Isl±m, where Muslim q±Ωµs and officials work. Islamic law, sharµ‘a,
is enforced by those in power. It is a great situation for them to be able to solve any
legal issues according to sharµ‘a. They should give thanks.”15
Defending Muslims like himself who assumed the pivotal role of judges,
and who thereby guaranteed the country’s status as D±r al-Isl±m, he con-
demned “instigators of fitna” and “Sufis who are worse than mad dogs in
bazaars.” The Andijan revolt had only “deprived Islam of its shrine, and all the
Muslims were driven away from the house of peace. Peaceful Egypt was dam-
aged and the ease of the Nile turned into a mirage.”16 Not all influential
Muslims shared this view, however. In the 1890s, after returning from pilgrim-
age to Mecca and Medina and having received directions from the Prophet in
a dream, Dukchi Ishan set out to reform the religion of the ostensibly wayward
people of the Ferghana Valley and is said to have directed particular criticism
at figures such as T±’ib, who, he charged, were corrupt and ignorant.17 Dukchi
15 Komatsu, 2007, p. 7.
16 Ibidem, p. 10.
17 Ibidem, pp. 11-14.
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Ishan’s critique appealed to many in the restive Ferghana region, but his re-
volt was an extraordinary occurrence. In 1892, the population of Tashkent
revolted during a cholera epidemic, while settled and nomadic communities
alike clashed with the authorities on a smaller scale in various places. But such
events did not mobilize a unified opposition animated by an Islamic idiom or
leadership, contrary to the anxious warnings on the part of officials such as
Dukhovskoj about the dangers of Sufism and Pan-Islam after 1898. Even the
rebellion of 1916 divided Muslims: a number of clerics continued to call for re-
spect for Russian authority, while others rejected these pleas. From the 1860s
through the First World War, most Hanafi ‘ulam±’ appear to have regarded
Turkestan as D±r al-Isl±m, a judgment that may have been based on a fatw±
establishing this juridical consensus.18 As in other regions of the empire, tsarist
authorities attempted to reinforce the notion that submission to tsarist rule was
a religious obligation by circulating sermons and poems in praise of the em-
peror and by organizing mosque prayers and other public ceremonies at which
Muslim notables pledged their loyalty to the dynasty and empire.19
In the early twentieth century, many Turkestani notables nonetheless chal-
lenged the status quo of life in the empire in a number of complex ways. Some
reformist thinkers turned their energies to the reform of Turkestani society
independent of the state, while many more local elites looked instead to the
regime. Samarkandi notables who spoke on behalf of their town and district in
a petition to Count Palen in October 1908 reflected the latter approach. They
envisioned a central place for the tsarist state in the amelioration of their “reli-
gious, economic, and political needs.”20 The Samarkandis began their petition
by protesting their exclusion from the Third State Duma. Muslims from other
parts of the empire were represented, they conceded, but none knew the “com-
pletely different way of life” of “we Turkestanis.” The petitioners sought elec-
toral parity with other parts of the empire (specifically requesting revision of
the temporary law of June 3, 1907). While seeking a greater voice in the affairs
of the empire as a whole, these notables also pushed for the autonomy of Mus-
lim religious institutions, especially schools, courts, and endowments [waqfs],
for the “right to fulfill all religious commands of the Qur’an, Muhammad and
18 See Komatsu’s discussion of a fatw± mentioned by the chronicler Mirza ‘Abd al-‘Azim Sami in ibidem pp.
16-17. Regarding the motives of the rebels of 1916, Adeeb Khalid argues, “the Revolt was a protest against colo-
nial oppression, land expropriation, and military conscription; Islam was never an issue.” Khalid, 2007, p. 49.
19 See Erkinov, 2004; Sahadeo, 2007; Crews, 2003a. 
20 “Peticija tuzemcev g. Samarkanda i uezda (usl.)”: RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 264, ll. 30-237 ob., at
http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t896.html.
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the interpretations of the scholars,” and for legal and educational affairs to be
conducted “according to the sharµ‘a.” Such calls for autonomy were circum-
scribed, however, by an awareness of the institutional architecture constructed
by the tsarist state for Muslims elsewhere: echoing other Turkestani commu-
nities of the time, the Samarkandis demanded an “ecclesiastical assembly” led
by a single figure, a Shaykh al-Isl±m, to regularize legal judgments and to dis-
cipline law court judges and other clerical figures.21
These supplicants clearly imagined that the power of the empire could be
brought to bear on behalf of a wider and more systematic application of God’s
law, as they interpreted it. They envisaged a single form of sharµ‘a to be intro-
duced uniformly among all the diverse inhabitants of the governor-generalship:
“All peoples [narodnosti] of Turkestan, namely: Kirgiz, Kazakhs, Afghans,
Iranians, Sarts and Uzbeks should be subject to the sharµ‘a, because they are all
Muslims. And their law court judges and other clerical figures should be appointed
according to the sharµ‘a and ‘‘∞dati’ (custom) should be abolished.”22
Without openly identifying themselves as Sunni adherents of the Hanafi
school of law, the petitioners called on the regime to impose their legal princi-
ples on Shi’ites as well as nomadic populations that followed customary legal
norms that sometimes differed from those of the sharµ‘a. They called for the
prosecution of all who insulted the faith and of women who appeared in pub-
lic without the veil. Their confidence in the validity of their claims extended
to the demand that Muslims be accorded equal rights with Christians in all
matters, including those concerning clerics of the different faiths. Although
they requested equality with Christians, the Samarkandis also asked that the
government affirm social distinctions:
“People [should be] divided among four ranks, the first, second, third, and fourth,
so that they have preference with respect to their rank when giving evidentiary
testimony.”23
In an appendix to their appeal, these petitioners also demanded that the
government reinforce another kind of hierarchy, the one between Muslims and
Jews. From the earliest days of the tsarist conquest, Russian observers had
identified slaves and indigenous Jews as the most unfortunate victims of the re-
gion’s despotic fiefdoms. But as with other aspects of Russian administration
21 RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 264, ll. 30-237 ob., at http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t896.html.
22 Ibidem.
23 RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 264, ll. 30-237 ob., at http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t896.html. 
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in Turkestan, officials articulated conflicting positions about the desirability
of defending Jews against Muslims.24 Having declared an end to slavery, offi-
cial policies toward Jews were far more ambivalent. Kaufman presented his
administration as a force against all forms of exploitation, targeting the money-
lending practices of Indian merchants in Turkestan and ultimately driving many
to emigrate.25 At the same time, while tsarist officials criticized local Jews’
subordination to Islamic law, they disagreed about whether or not legal cases
involving Muslims and Jews should be removed from the jurisdiction of the
q±Ωµs. From the Samarkandi petitioners to Jadids such as Mahmudxo‘ja
Behbudiy [Ma∆mpid Khw±ja Bihbpidµ], Muslim notables repeatedly pressed the
regime to make Jews subject to the sharµ‘a in mixed cases.26 In 1903, the
Minister of Justice argued that Jews should no longer be subject to Islamic law.
The Ministry of War rejected this view, however, and local courts continued to
interpret the issue in conflicting ways until a Senate resolution of 1913 finally
removed them from the q±Ωµs’ jurisdiction and assigned them to state courts.27
Another concern for these petitioners, the position of women, reflected
even more dramatically tsarist ambivalence about embarking on a civilizing
mission where administrative practice called for adaptability and where, in the
end, the state apparatus still depended upon local participants, if not elites. As
Tomohiko Uyama has argued, tsarist officials consistently reasoned that
“failure to adopt particularistic ways to implement measures would lead to
revolt and other tragic situations.”28 Russian observers made the need for the
reform of gender relations in Turkestan a constant refrain of their commentary,
but, in practice, the administration remained dependent upon Islamic institu-
tions and the centrality of the sharµ‘a. As in Orthodox Russia itself, the stric-
tures of religious law continued to govern marriage, divorce, and the family.
The Saviors of Asia
Islam was both a domestic and a geopolitical concern. Despite treaty agree-
ments in 1873, 1881, 1887, and 1895 that formally demarcated Russian terri-
tory, the borders of Turkestan, like those of Transcaucasia, never acquired the
24 Crews, 2004. 
25 See Levi, 2002, pp. 250-260.
26 See, for example, RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 264, ll. 223-226, http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-
halle.de/t895.html; and CGA RUz, f. I-18, op. 1, d. 1600. Behbudiy’s scenario envisioned that a Jewish
scholar would also participate in such deliberations. See Hablemito©lu and Kocao©lu, 2001, pp. 440, 445.
27 Crews, 2004, pp. 476-489.
28 Uyama, 2007, p. 60.
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permanence of other imperial boundaries. Local Muslim populations continued
to move across porous borders, despite tsarist efforts to prohibit repeated waves
of in-migration from Persia and Afghanistan and sever ties between Turkestan
and Xinjiang;moreover, political allegiances remained in flux.29 Although there
was no consensus in Russian or British military circles about how these spaces
should be managed, a number of tsarist officers lobbied for the further annex-
ation of neighboring regions and even for a campaign to expel the British from
the subcontinent.30 From the Russian perspective, it was the religious identity
shared by these diverse peoples that carried the greatest weight in discussions
of the political future of the region. In 1875, Kaufman had warned that Russia’s
future position in the region might be threatened by “an enormous, general
Muslim movement not only among us, but also in India.”31
The unsettled frontiers of Turkestan, from Mashhad to Chitral and Kashgar,
were arenas for intrigue in which the Russians and British vied with one an-
other – and with local notables – for influence. While questions of strategy,
military technology, and transportation infrastructure all figured into tsarist de-
bates, the Russians were also interested in the political loyalties and attitudes
of the populations under the rule of their rivals. A series of buffer states, as
well as the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountain ranges, separated the governor-
generalship from the territory under the direct control of the Government of
India. The British nonetheless responded to the Russian challenge with alarm,
and exaggerated accounts of tsarist troops appearing at the “gates of India”
prompted the British to devise elaborate plans for the defense of the subconti-
nent. The British thus pursued an intelligence network based in Khorasan, in
northeastern Persia with information-gathering contacts among Afghans,
Turkmen, and Persians throughout Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Persia. British
agents focused their efforts on thwarting Russian plots aimed at winning over
men of influence and inciting anti-British rebellions in Afghanistan and the
North West Frontier Province. Like the Russians, they looked to Muslim reli-
gious networks to gain leverage against their geopolitical rivals. In Mashhad,
the British consulate made payments from the late 1880s to the leading Shi’ite
clerics (including several mujtahids, the chief mull±, and, later, the head of the
29 See, for example, Zhigalina, 2002. On the Transcaucasian borders, see Tapper, 1997.
30 See the excellent studies by Morrison, 2006; Marshall, 2006; Siegel, 2002; as well as the documents in
Zagorodnikova, 2005.
31 Vigasin, 1997, p. 161.
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shrine of Im±m Reza). Following instability in the Russian empire from 1904,
British intelligence-gathering from Mashhad intensified.32
If Islam posed a threat in the minds of men like Kaufman, it also presented
Russia with opportunities. When tsarist ministers and diplomats surveyed the
map of Turkestan and its surrounding territories seeking advantage against the
British world empire, they imagined themselves in competition with the British
for the sympathies of the “native population” of India. From at least the 1850s,
many Russian observers of the British in India saw great promise in Russia’s
advance to the south. Various schemes to invade India echoed one that was
drawn up in 1863 by General-Lieutenant Stepan A. Khrulev (1807-1870), a
veteran of the sieges of Sevastopol’ and Ak-Mechet’, who called for “an upris-
ing of the natives” and a “union with the Afghans.” Commenting on the revolt
of 1857, Khrulev concluded that the “sepoys’ bunt revealed how uncertain
English rule is beyond the Indus and how easy it might be to spark by external
incitement and support a revolt on the part of Muslims and Hindus.”33 In Asia,
32 Morris, 1984; and Johnson, 2003.
33 Vigasin, 1997, pp. 128-130.
Mosque of Skobelev (Ferghana), after 1910.
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Russians were to appear as “defenders of the native population against English
domination.”34
Contacts with British subjects further bolstered this confidence as news of
the Russian arrival in Central Asia spread throughout the subcontinent: in 1865,
the head of the princely state of Indore offered his backing to Alexander II in
the event of a Russian invasion of India. The ruler pledged to support the Rus-
sians, as long as they swore an oath not to interfere with his internal govern-
ment affairs, disarm his forces, prevent the minting of coins, interfere in matters
relating to Islamic law or “touch our religion.” In July 1867, an envoy arrived
in Tashkent from Indore carrying a letter (apparently written in invisible ink)
in Hindi, with a Russian translation, asking for protection against the British.
Though the military governor of the Turkestan district chose to give “no seri-
ous consideration to the envoy,” others followed, including Sikh dissidents
from Punjab who also agitated for a Russian invasion.35 In 1879, Baba Ram
Singh sent an appeal to Kaufman. His letter told the story of Guru Govind
Singh who had predicted that “the English will appear, they will oppress all the
peoples of India and will torment the small and the great; afterwards the
Russians will arrive in India and drive the English out: the Russian hero
[bogatyr’] will seize it and take possession of it.” “The prophecy of Guru Baba
Nanak Sahib says,” the message continued, “that you will come and save us.
315 thousand Sikhs will join you.”36 In 1887, Dulip Singh, the son of one of
the last Punjabi maharajas, traveled to Russia after several years in England.
Though he left Moscow in 1888, he published an address in a newspaper in
Geneva in June 1889 in which he called on “All Indians, Brahmins, Sikhs,
Muhammadans, and Christians” to choose “between independence and eternal
slavery” and to “pronounce prayers to God for our impending triumph.”
Victory against the British would come, Singh intoned, “only with the help of
the Almighty and with the material support of Russia.”37
The administrative center of Turkestan, Tashkent, was a strategic hub for the
coordination of anti-British activities. Although diplomats in India and else-
where reported to the foreign ministry in St. Petersburg, the Governor-Gen-
eral of Turkestan also formed an essential part of this network. The consul
general in Bombay addressed correspondence to St. Petersburg, London, and
34 Zagorodnikova, 2005, p. 52. See, also, Morrison, 2006.
35 Zagorodnikova, 2005, pp. 139-141.
36 Ibidem, p. 243. 
37 Ibidem, p. 281.
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Tashkent. The capital of the governor-generalship was also the destination of
Indian petitioners and envoys – including Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs –
appealing to Russia for assistance against the British. From Tashkent, Russian
intelligence officers traveled widely to gather information on the ground. These
men typically had a background that allowed them to compare the outlooks of
both British and tsarist subjects. Nearly all had prior experience in Russia’s
Muslim borderlands. Many began their careers in the Crimean War and were
veterans of the pacification and administration of the Caucasus, the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-1878, as well as the conquest of Central Asia. The im-
perative to contrast tsarist and British rule yielded celebrations of the
superiority of tsarist rule, in general, and Russian justice, in particular. One
Russian spy sent on a mission to India reflected on whether
“[…] our brief experience in Central Asia [does] not give us glaring examples
of the fact that once the native population, having become convinced of the
sincerity and fairness of the conquerers, thanks to their responsiveness to the
needs of the population, [their] accessibility and dogged work for their benefit,
willingly turns to them with all of their needs and often prefers the individual
judgment of the representatives of Russian authority in conflicts among them-
selves to judgments according to the sharµ‘a or custom.”38
Juxtaposing the merits of Russian tolerance and the British obsession with
race, these officers tended to share the perspective of Lieutenant-Colonel Niko-
laj Ja. Shneur, who highlighted in a report of 1881 the “extraordinary yoke,
moral and material” under which the population of India suffered. The British
constantly reminded the “natives” in “all of their colonies” that “they belong
to a lower race.” British subjects’ hatred of their rulers made them ripe for an
“open rebellion” at the slightest pretext.
“Russia’s name,” he concluded, “definitely enjoys among the native population
enormous respect, as the primordial enemy of the English and thus as the antici-
pated deliverer in the future from the yoke of the latter.”39
Without even crossing into Indian territory, Shneur maintained, St. Peters-
burg could prompt an uprising by moving on Herat. Should Russian forces
enter India itself, he predicted, uprisings would accompany their arrival, and
the Russians could anticipate the backing of the rulers of the princely states
and even mutiny within the ranks of the Indian army. This vulnerability – “like
38 Vais, 1990, p. 220.
39 Vigasin, 1997, pp. 254-255.
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the sword of Damocles” – presented London with an “Indian question,” Shneur
contended, which Russia could instrumentalize “in all questions of interna-
tional politics.”40
This view presented Russia’s Muslim neighbors as pawns in the struggle with
Great Britain, and even induced many such observers to disregard evidence that
did not actively support the representation of Russia as “liberator.” In February
1890, General Nikolaj G. Stoletov (1834-1912) wrote to Minister of War Dmitrij
A. Miljutin (1816-1912) describing his recent visit to India in which he posed as
a Swiss professor and managed to “get to know many native Muslims.”
“The natives are convinced,” he reported, “that war between England and Russia
will begin soon, and that the hopes placed on us are enormous among all classes
of native society.”41
For Stoletov, not just Afghanistan, but Persia figured into any Russian strat-
egy against India. Though the British claimed to have the Persians on their
side, Stoletov boasted that tsarist influence could be increased there, and the
Persians turned against the British:
“Knowing the country sufficiently well, I have the basis to think that we can do
whatever we like with Persia.”42
Seeking information about the impact of Russian expansion, another officer
found in 1881 that the Indian population had been impressed by reports from
Akhal-Teke and expected Skobelev’s imminent arrival: “it is in Russia that the
masses see their future deliverer.”43 As he neared the Afghan border, however,
he encountered “complete apathy” rather than the enthusiasm he had expected,
though he was not sure whether this was due to the “intolerable heat” or the
“terrible yoke of the English.”44 Pointing to the British insistence on demonstrat-
ing that their colonial subjects “belong to a lower race,” the same report as-
serted that the unpopular British “strongly fear Russia” and spy on every
Russian who appeared there.”45 In the early twentieth century, Russian travel-
ers continued to highlight the enlightened character of tsarist rule vis-à-vis the
British empire. In a secret report of 1905, a Russian officer recounted a conver-
sation (conducted in Persian) with Indian army officers who were, he claimed,
40 Ibidem.
41 Ibidem, p. 245. 
42 Ibidem, p. 246.
43 Ibidem, p. 252.
44 Ibidem, p. 253.
45 Ibidem, p. 254.
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“clearly astounded, having learned that we have even in the highest positions of-
ficers who are of Asian background and Muhammadan.”46
This image of Russia’s appeal among Muslims and Asians inspired
grandiose schemes for the extension of tsarist power from Turkestan and, at the
same time, this power remained fundamentally intertwined with the domestic
administration of the territory. Muslims emigrated from the Caucasus and the
Crimea in significant numbers during this period, often fleeing violent assault
at the hands of tsarist troops, and, in smaller waves, elites departed from the de-
feated states of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand. With the establishment of the
governor-generalship, however, Muslims and other religious communities
inhabiting adjacent lands began to migrate to Russian-controlled territory. From
the early 1890s, for example, Hazara, Aimaq, and Turkmen tribes fled the
expanding state of the Afghan Amµr Abdur Rahman, who himself had sought
asylum in Turkestan from 1870 to 1880. They attempted to emigrate to
Turkestan following a series of uprisings, repression, forced resettlement, and
Pashtun colonization.47 According to tsarist authorities, these refugees sought
“rescue from persecution” by Afghan authorities and saw “our territory” as
“the last sanctuary from brutal reprisals.”48 Although such appeals affirmed
Russian officials’ image of Turkestan as a refuge for the dispossessed, their
approach frequently reflected a cautious appreciation of the wider geopolitical
consequences. In the case of Afghan émigrés, they feared antagonizing Kabul
and generally discouraged flight in large groups across the border. Though they
frequently permitted small groups and individual families, in other cases they
returned them to Afghanistan or dispatched them on to Persian territory.49 In
some instances, local authorities gave some refugees small parcels of land near
the border. A number of tribal notables received stipends in Tashkent or
Samarkand, where they were “interned,” often along with their families. These
tribal elders repeatedly offered to join the Russians in waging war against the
Afghan state. Russian authorities, in turn, kept them on the payroll as clients
in the event they would be needed in a time of war – and to forestall the risk
of their flight back to Afghanistan. Such payments to Afghan émigré notables
continued through 1917.50
46 Otchety, 1905, pp. 32-33.
47 Mousavi, 1998, pp. 111-154.
48 See, for example, RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 2767, ll. 16-16ob.; and RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692.
49 RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 2767.
50 RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, ll. 103-109ob.
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Where Russian officials sensed greater advantages, they acted more force-
fully to provide safe haven to religious dissidents. Since the 1840s, tsarist diplo-
mats had closely followed the appearance in Persia of a new religious
community, the Babis, inspired by the millenarian teachings of Sayyid ‘Ali
Muhammad Shirazi. Faced with severe repression by the Qajars, the move-
ment gave rise to new leadership, under a nobleman who assumed the title
Baha’u’llah. Initially wary of some of the social practices adopted by these
communities, Russian scholars gradually began to see the Baha’is as a commu-
nity evolving from devotion to Islam toward an approximation of Christianity.
Like other European observers, tsarist diplomats attempted to trace the spread
of these communities and gauge their impact on the stability of the country.
One Russian diplomat put the number of one of these groups, the Babis, at one
million, and George Curzon speculated that they might drive Muslims out of
Persia. Seeking clients that might offer Russia leverage against the Qajar
regime, Russian officials, in turn, recognized their potential geopolitical value
and permitted Baha’is to flee the underground in Persia to settle in the empire.
The Russian consul general in Beirut, Vil’gel’m [Wilhelm] O. von Klemm
(1861 – post-1927), remained in contact with the exiled Baha’u’llah and his rel-
atives, apparently acting as an intermediary between Baha’is in Russia and
their leader in Ottoman Akka. Within Persia itself, the Russian embassy in
Tehran seems to have offered protection to Baha’is as well.51 Although
Baha’u’llah rejected both tsarist and British overtures to relocate his commu-
nity to Russia or India, he consented to the emigration of a community of
merchants under the leadership of his son-in-law to the Russian Transcaspian
region. The tsarist-sponsored Baha’i colony at Ashkhabad, just across the bor-
der from Khorasan, opened up schools (with instruction in Arabic and
Esperanto), established libraries, and printed religious literature. The Russian
general Dean I. Subbotich (1852 – post-1906) laid the foundation stone of their
“House of Worship,” the first such institution in the history of the Baha’is.52
Protection of this dissident community gave tsarist diplomats, merchants,
and spies access to a growing transnational network of Baha’is, but it compli-
cated the regime’s management of the local confessional landscape. Muslims
protested the presence of the Baha’is to both tsarist officals and the shah, who
filed a protest with the Russian ambassador, and the Samarkandi petition cited
above requested that Baha’i literature be censored and prohibited from
51 Bazilenko, 1996, p. 57.
52 Momen, 1991, pp. 278-305.
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appearing in “Muslim script.”53 Shi’ite scholars, in particular, criticized latitude
toward the Baha’is. Many tsarist officials had long viewed Shi’ites as a
counterweight to Sunnis – and their more powerful political supporters, but, as
a celebrated murder case in 1889 revealed, the imperial regime sought to
cultivate the Baha’i community. When a Baha’i was murdered by Shi’ites in
an Ashkhabad bazaar in September, Alexander III dispatched a special inves-
tigative commission and discovered a network of conspirators that stretched to
Tehran and Tabriz. The military tribunal’s guilty verdicts were celebrated in
the Baha’i community as
“the first instance of justice and assistance that the world afforded this community
through the equity of this great Monarch and renowned Tsar, which bolted out the
threat of inveterate enemies towards a handful of meek who have no other cham-
pion save the exalted God.”54
Praising “the potency of the Russian Government, which has become the
haven of justice in the East,” a Baha’i chronicle contrasted “the ways that the
Russian and the Iranian Governments administer justice and conduct trials,”
noting that “the governmental authorities in Russia did not accept a single coin
from anyone and in fact, due to their devotion to equity and justice, no one
dared to even mention the word ‘bribe’ or mediate on behalf of defendants.”55
Such representations of tsarist power bolstered Russian official images and
strengthened ties between the Russian administration and international reli-
gious networks, but they did not dispel all anxieties about communities that
crossed imperial borders. Through their experience with the Baha’is, Russian
officials came to appreciate some of the risks that the dissident question
entailed. The Governor-General of the Caspian region (and future Minister of
War), Aleksej N. Kuropatkin (1848-1925; r. 1890-1898), apparently cooled
toward the Baha’is when word reached him that the dissident communities
whom he hoped to use against Persia may have, in fact, served as a Trojan
horse for British interests.56 International ties might cut both ways, leaving the
tsarist empire vulnerable to espionage and subversion.
As in other parts of the empire, the regime attempted to appropriate transna-
tional networks and pursue a policy of prophylaxis simultaneously in Central
Asia. Officials worried not only about spies and missionaries from Istanbul.
53 RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 264.
54 Gulpaygani, 2000. 
55 Ibidem.
56 Bazilenko, 1996, p. 62.
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They saw British agents at every turn. Local Muslims were also suspected of
spying for the Afghans and Chinese. In the early twentieth century, German
reconnaissance teams were not far behind. Russia’s defeat at the hands of the
Japanese in 1905 seemed to embolden all of Asia as well as the European
powers who would challenge the tsarist position there.
The geopolitical challenge appeared more daunting where, as with the
Baha’is, religious conflicts between different communities afforded rivals
opportunities for meddling. In a region where Sunni Muslims predominated,
Shi’ites became candidates for particular attention from the state. In the
Caucasus, agents of the Pax Russica had prided themselves in managing con-
fessional differences between these two groups. In Central Asia, the adminis-
tration welcomed Persian émigrés who worked in railway construction, though
it sought to mute the public celebration of potentially divisive rites, including
the processions of flagellating mourners that accompanied the annual com-
memoration of the martyrdom of Husayn – and that persisted in secret.57 But
the management of relations between Sunnis and Shi’ites proved especially
difficult because the administration did not directly govern all of the territories
where mixed settlements existed. In 1868, St. Petersburg had made the Emi-
rate of Bukhara a protectorate, assuming responsibility for its foreign relations
but allowing significant domestic autonomy. Celebrated throughout the Mus-
lim world as a bastion of Sunni orthodoxy, Bukhara’s emirs had engaged in
heated controversies with Shi’ites, even though the latter played an important
role in governing the Emirate. In 1910, the two groups came to blows in
Bukhara during the Shi’ite mourning commemoration, prompting renewed
calls for Russian annexation of the territory by critics of Bukharan autonomy.
But the Shi’ites in the Bukharan capital were not the primary concern of
Russian administrators. Instead, their attention largely focused on the small
Ismaili communities dotting the Pamir Mountains. The Anglo-Russian
delimitation of the border between Afghanistan and the tsarist empire in 1895
along the upper reaches of the Amu Darya, the Panj, prompted official worry
about these mountain communities. In order to fulfill its obligations toward
London (which negotiated on behalf of the Afghan Emir), St. Petersburg had to
convince the Bukharan Emir to give up territory on the left bank of the Panj to
Kabul’s control. In contentious negotiations, tsarist officials proposed to compen-
sate him for Darvaz (on the left bank of the river) with the Pamir principalities
of Rushan, Shugnan, and Vakhan (all on the right bank). Impoverished and
57 RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 2895.
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sparsely populated, the region offered little for the Bukharan treasury, especially
after Russian officials had attempted to mollify the local population by granting
them tax exemptions. Conflicts between the Emir’s Sunni administrators and
local Ismailis only intensified the Emir’s displeasure with the arrangement. For
their part, Ismaili delegations repeatedly appealed to the tsarist administration to
accept them as imperial subjects and rule them directly from Tashkent. “We have
always prayed to God to free us from the Bukharan Emir,” one Ismaili petition
of 1890 complained, because “the Bukharans persecute our faith and scoff at us,
they do not eat with us or sit with us, regarding us forbidden to them, and they
say that we are unbelievers.”58 A Russian military outpost at Khorog constantly
intervened in Bukharan administrative affairs, and its officers lobbied vigorously
for their Ismaili charges in dispatches to Tashkent and St. Petersburg, criticizing
Bukharan misrule and highlighting the Sunni persecution of the Ismailis.
Though sympathetic to the humanitarian rhetoric of such protests, tsarist au-
thorities hesitated to annex the region, fearing that such a move would tip the
geopolitical balance and lend support to British demands for territorial com-
pensation elsewhere. Yet the status quo in the Pamirs presented dangers as well.
The Ismailis, officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed, were not the
conventional Shi’ites that Russians had encountered elsewhere. They owed al-
legiance (and tithes) to a single leader who bore the hereditary title Aga Khan
[“lord and master”]. In the 1840s, the forty-sixth Nizari Ismaili im±m, Aga Khan
I, had fled Persia for Afghanistan and then India, where the British backed the
establishment of a permanent seat for the im±m in Bombay in 1848. British sup-
port was critical to the Aga Khan’s claims to supremacy in the religious affairs
of the subcontinent’s Ismaili communities. In the “Aga Khan Case” of 1866,
the Bombay High Court affirmed his leadership. In 1905, the same court
rebuffed a group of plaintiffs led by the Aga Khan’s cousin who questioned the
im±m’s status as head of the community. The ruling solidified the position of the
Ismailis under British rule and aided the Aga Khan in further distinguishing the
community under his guidance from both Sunnis and Twelver Shi’ites.59
The Russians watched the extension of his authority through Ismaili
communal organizations with alarm. Their objection was not simply that he
represented the spiritual master of communities in Russia and its protectorate.
Worse, they suspected him of being an “Anglophile.” The Aga Khan’s support
for an English-style university at Aligarh and other reformist measures placed
58 RGVIA, f. 400, op.1, d. 2329, l. 42ob.
59 See Daftary, 1998, especially, pp. 193-209. 
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the im±m in this category of subversives. The tsarist authorities regarded him
as an exploiter of his people who was determined to keep his followers in blind
ignorance. All of these factors suited him to become “a simple tool of the
Anglo-Indian government” and, simultaneously, a servant of “Pan-Islamism,”
with aspirations to unify the world’s Muslims.60
Russian fears that the British would use the Aga Khan to manipulate the
800,000 Ismailis in four neighboring states under his power inspired a complex
prophylactic strategy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its architect was
none other than Klemm, the former consul general in Beirut, who had
cultivated contacts among Baha’is and their spiritual head in Ottoman exile in
Akka. Through contacts in Bombay, Klemm had learned that a schism had
occurred within the Ismaili community under the Aga Khan. In early 1904, he
proposed a conspiracy to discredit the Aga Khan among his followers within
the Russian orbit. In Bombay, he identified a group of critics chafing under the
im±m. They formed “not a dogmatic schism” but one triggered by dissatisfac-
tion with the leader’s disposal of economic resources and his supposed plans
to marry an English woman. By the fall, a representative of the Russian
consulate had recruited two missionaries, Musa Guljam Khusein and Pir
Muhammad Ibrakhim; the Russian agent liked the latter in particular because
he knew Persian, was very religious and “truly does not love the Aga Khan
and the English.”61 In October, they signed contracts obliging them to travel to
Russian Central Asia to preach in exchange for payment and travel expenses.
They were to bring with them the appropriate literature and photographs of the
Aga Khan, preparing the way for his “unmasking” [oblichenie] before fol-
lowers who resided in the Pamirs and in small pockets within the governor-
generalship of Turkestan.
These missionaries turned out to be ill-equipped for conspiracy, however.
Officials complained that they blew their cover as merchants by showing up at
the government offices immediately upon arrival. Moreover, the Ismailis they
encountered in Turkestan, themselves emissaries from the Pamiri mountain
communities, found their arguments nonsensical. Seeing the apparent incom-
petence of their agents and fearing a wider scandal, the tsarist officers quickly
abandoned the scheme and sent them packing for home (though without much
of their luggage), by way of Odessa. The anti-Aga Khan conspirators never
saw the Ismaili communities in the Pamirs.
60 AVPRI, f. 214, op. 779, d. 24. 
61 Ibidem.
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Conclusion
Tsarist military and diplomatic officials continuously probed the limits of
Russian power in Central Asia. While building an administrative apparatus to
secure Turkestan for the empire, they still looked to the east – to China’s “New
Frontier” (Xinjiang) – and to the south – to British India, Afghanistan, and
Persia. Events in Europe and the Far East often determined the scope of
Russia’s opportunities in its borderlands. Yet tsarist elites reasoned that their
ability to project power in Asia also depended upon Russia’s image in these
territories. Russian tolerance of Islam formed a strategy both for the adminis-
tration of Turkestan and for the assertion of tsarist authority beyond the formal
borders of the state. For the diplomats and generals who charted the course of
Russia’s imperial mission in Asia, the fate of the empire hinged on the ability
to do both.
Many of Russia’s generals in Turkestan may have been committed Pan-
Slavs and pious Orthodox Christians, but their approach to the faiths of the
governor-generalship and its neighboring countries reflected extraordinary
flexibility. At the same time, they were guided by more than pragmatism. Like
tsarist diplomats in the Ottoman empire and Persia, Russian officials in
Turkestan cultivated a strong sense of a moral calling – a condition they found
lacking in the “Muslim East.” Though serfdom had barely been abolished and
tsarist law enshrined gender inequality in the Russian empire, these men high-
lighted slavery, the oppression of women, sexual depravity, and the persecution
of religious and other minority groups as the key features of the “despotism”
that they sought to supplant in Central Asia. Wary of the constraints that law
might place on the autocracy elsewhere in the empire, tsarist authorities cham-
pioned law as a force to liberate the peoples of the east. Decades before the Bol-
sheviks sought out Muslim women to act as a “surrogate proletariat” and bring
about revolution in Central Asia, the tsarist regime looked for support among
religious and other communities who ostensibly suffered under the yoke of
religious persecution or oppression at the hands of “Asiatic” despots – or, more
frequently, British colonial masters – along Turkestan’s frontiers. Rejecting the
calls of the faithful, the Bolsheviks focused on the cries of the dispossessed;
and without being conscious of the continuity, the Soviet regime, like the one
it replaced, imagined itself as the savior of Asia, a contagious proposition that
would continue to shape the policies of the great powers toward Central Asia
into the twenty-first century.
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Abbreviations
AVPRI Arkhiv vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii [Foreign Policy Archive of
the Russian Empire]
RGIA Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj istoricheskij arkhiv [Russian State Historical
Archive]
RGVIA Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj voenno-istoricheskij arkhiv [Russian State
Military History Archive]
CGA RUz Central’nyj gosudarstvennyj arkhiv respubliki Uzbekistan [Central State
Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan]
Archives
AVPRI fond 214, Rossijskoe general’noe konsul’stvo v Bombee [Russian
General Consulate in Bombay].
CGA RUz fond I-18, Samarkandskoe oblastnoe upravlenie [Samarkand Regional
Administration].
RGIA fond 1396, Revizija senatora K.K. Palena Turkestanskogo kraia [Inspec-
tion of Turkestan by K. K. Palen].
RGVIA fond 1396, Shtab Turkestanskogo voennogo okruga [Turkestan Military
District Staff].
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